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Another View: Our Magnificent
Constitution
William Bradford Reynolds*
Let me start with the observation that I regard myself to be
most privileged to be a public servant at a time when we celebrate
the 200th anniversary of the Constitution-a magnificent docu-
ment that has, in my view, no equal in history and every reason to
be feted. It is by now no revelation that the Framers would be
aghast at the size and reach of government today; but they would
also be enormously proud of how much of their legacy has en-
dured. The vitality of the original Constitution, and its various
amendments, is reflected by its ability to withstand spirited debate
over its content and meaning, a process that thankfully has been
taking place with more and more enthusiasm in town meetings and
forums all around the country, involving students, public officials,
and citizens of every variety in evaluating how well our Constitu-
tion has served us over the past two centuries. I find it remarka-
ble-and an enormous tribute to the Constitution-that in every
instance about which I have read, these gatherings have been hard-
pressed to think of ways in which to improve it in any meaningful
manner.
That is not to say that the original Constitution of 1787 was
flawless. And in our celebration of the document, we must not
overlook its flaws and our long and painful struggles to correct
them.
If there was any tendency to do so, it was no doubt corrected
when Justice Thurgood Marshall spoke in Hawaii on the Constitu-
tion's Bicentennial celebration.1 Whatever degree of disagreement
one might have with Justice Marshall's comments, he has invigo-
rated the debate on the meaning and vitality of constitutional
* Assistant Attorney General of the United States, Civil Rights Division, and Counselor
to the Attorney General of the United States. Assistant Attorney General Reynolds deliv-
ered this speech on May 23, 1987, at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. These
remarks are reprinted in the Vanderbilt Law Review with his permission.
1. See Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong Docu-
ment?, supra, at 1337.
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principles in a focused way that can only serve to underscore the
importance of the document itself and why it is so deserving of this
Bicentennial celebration.
In recounting his remarks, I will rely on Justice Marshall's
own words. He began by warning against what he called the "ten-
dency for the celebration to oversimplify" the adoption and mean-
ing of the Constitution of 1787 and to "overlook the many other
events that have been instrumental to our achievements as a na-
tion 2-events that, as he explains, included the Civil War and the
amendments added to the Constitution in its wake.3 Thus, he re-
jected what he described as a complacent belief that the "vision of
those who debated and compromised in Philadelphia yielded 'the
more perfect Union' it is said we now enjoy."4 Justice Marshall re-
marked further that he does not believe-and I quote-that "the
meaning of the Constitution was forever 'fixed' at the Philadelphia
Convention[;] " 5 nor does he find "the wisdom, foresight, and sense
of justice exhibited by the Framers particularly profound."8 The
government the Framers of 1787 devised, he declared, "was defec-
tive from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and
momentous social transformation to attain the system of constitu-
tional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and
human rights, we hold as fundamental today."
7
More specifically, Justice Marshall faulted the original Consti-
tution because, as he put it, the Framers "did not have in mind the
majority of America's citizens." 8 The Preamble's "We the People,"
the Justice said, included only whites.9 Justice Marshall observes
that the Constitution tacitly addressed the slavery issue in two
ways: in article I, section 2 by counting "other Persons" as three-
fifths of "free Persons" for purposes of congressional representa-
tion; and in article I, section 9, by protecting the authority of
states to continue importing slaves until 1808.10 Because the origi-
nal Constitution was defective in this manner, Justice Marshall
holds that "while the Union survived the civil war, the Constitu-








10. Id. at 1338-39.
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tion did not."11 Taking its place, he said, was "a new, more promis-
ing basis for justice and equality, the fourteenth amendment, en-
suring protection of the life, liberty, and property of all persons
against deprivations without due process and guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws."12 For Justice Marshall, it is this new Con-
stitution that we should celebrate; not the old one, which contains
"outdated notions of 'liberty,' 'justice,' and 'equality.' ,i Thus,
Justice Marshall declines to participate in the festivities with
"flag-waving fervor," but rather plans to celebrate the Bicentennial
of the Constitution as a "living document, including the Bill of
Rights and the other amendments protecting individual freedoms
and human rights.
'14
Justice Marshall chose to focus almost exclusively on the most
tragic aspects of the American experience, but he is absolutely
right to remind us of them. For the Constitution was intended to
be the culmination of a great struggle for the natural rights of
men-a philosophy whose cornerstone is the absolute guarantee of
equality under the law. When the Framers sought to protect in the
Constitution the fundamental rights of man but failed to guarantee
explicitly those rights to every individual, they introduced a self-
contradiction that preordained struggles and conflicts we continue
to confront today.
I am concerned, however, that what Justice Marshall has en-
couraged is far more than a simple mid-course correction in our
celebration of the Constitution. It is one thing to be reminded of
the compromise on slavery during the making of the Constitution.
It is quite another, however, to encourage the view that there are
two constitutions, the one of 1787, the other consisting of the Bill
of Rights and the fourteenth amendment; that the old one is so
thoroughly defective that it did not survive the Civil War, and that
the new one alone is worthy of celebration. Certainly, we ought to
understand and appreciate the original Constitution in light of its
weaknesses as well as its considerable strengths. But in the pro-
cess, we ought to respectfully decline the invitation to consign it to
the dustbin of history. That is a judgment as wrong as any on the
other side of the ledger that uncritically praises the document of
1787. We indeed need what Justice Marshall called for-a "proper
11. Id. at 1340.
12. Id. at 1340-41.
13. Id. at 1341.
14. Id. at 1342.
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sense of perspective.' 5
Notwithstanding its very serious flaws, the Constitution in its
original form constituted the greatest advance for human liberty in
the entire history of mankind, then or since. Indeed, it was only by
preserving our underlying constitutional system-one of divided
governmental authority and separated government powers-that
blacks could enjoy the fruits of liberty once that self-contradiction
to which I alluded was corrected.
Fresh from the experience of subjugation under the British
Crown on one hand, and the failure of the Articles of Confedera-
tion on the other, the Framers understood that there is an interde-
pendent relationship between fundamental rights and the struc-
ture and powers of government. Thus, they crafted a government
of limited powers, grounded in natural-law principles and deriving
its authority from the consent of the governed. They designed a
system to protect individual rights through a balance and separa-
tion of governmental powers, which would forever ensure that the
new national government would not exceed its enumerated powers.
Not the least of these checks against governmental invasions of in-
dividual rights was the creation in article III of an independent
judiciary as a guardian of constitutional values.
Many of the Framers were not satisfied to protect individual
rights merely by limiting the power of national government; they
insisted upon a Bill of Rights to safeguard explicitly those rights
they deemed most fundamental. Although the Bill of Rights was
adopted separately, it would be error to view the original Constitu-
tion apart from the first ten amendments, for the Framers agreed
from the outset that the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights
were the object of government to protect. Beyond setting forth
specific rights essential to a free people, the Framers established in
the ninth and tenth amendments a decentralized federal structure
to secure more fully the free exercise of individual rights and self-
government.
This was the basic structure of government the Framers
deemed necessary to vindicate the principles of the American
Revolution as set forth in the Declaration of Independence; and
that, in my view, is the unique and remarkable achievement we
celebrate today. But in celebrating the triumph of the Constitu-
tion, I am in full agreement that we must not overlook those parts
of the constitutional experiment that were not noble and which,
15. Id. at 1341.
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fortunately, have long since been corrected. Indeed, the experience
of the Framers' compromise on the issue of "equality under law"
provides us with important lessons even today.
From our historical vantage point, there is certainly no excuse
for the original Constitution's failure to repudiate slavery. In mak-
ing this deal with the devil-and departing from the absolute prin-
ciple of "equality under law"-the Framers undermined the moral
legitimacy of the Constitution.
But we ought to recognize that on this issue the Framers were
faced with a Hobson's choice. The Constitution required unani-
mous ratification by the states, and at least two of the states re-
fused to consent unless the slave trade was protected. James Wil-
son explained the dilemma: "Under the present Confederation, the
states may admit the importation of slaves as long as they please;
but by this article, after the year 1808, the Congress will have
power to prohibit such importation. . . . I consider this as laying
the foundation for banishing slavery out of this country."16 We
know now that this hope was far too optimistic; and indeed, it
would take the Civil War to rid the Nation of that evil institution.
But even as the Framers were acceding to this compromise,
they were sowing the seeds for the expansion of freedom to all in-
dividuals when circumstances would permit. James Wilson, for ex-
ample, emphasized that "the term slave was not admitted in this
Constitution.1 7 Instead, the term "Person" was used, suggesting
that when the slaves became "free Persons," they would be enti-
tled to all the rights appertaining to free individuals. 18
Indeed, many abolitionist leaders argued that the Constitu-
tion, by its omission of any mention of slavery, did not tolerate
slavery. Noting that the Constitution nowhere mentions the word
"slave," Frederick Douglass declared that "[iln that instrument, I
hold there is neither warrant, license, nor sanction of the hateful
thing."' 9 Yet such arguments were tragically unheeded by the
United States Supreme Court in the Dred Scott decision,20 which
provided succor to the notion that there are justifications for ex-
ceptions to the principle of "equality under law"-a notion that
despite its sordid origins has not been totally erased to this day.
16. 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 283 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
19. Goldwin, Why Blacks, Women and Jews Are Not Mentioned in the Constitution,
COMMENTARY, May 1987, at 30.
20. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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Indeed, the Dred Scott decision illustrates that a significant
part of the responsibility for our failure to make good on the prin-
ciple of "equality under law" can and should be assigned less to
shortcomings in the original Constitution-as Justice Marshall
would have us believe-but to those who sat where Justice Mar-
shall now sits, charged with interpreting that document.
Justice Marshall apparently believes that the original flaws in
the Constitution dictated the result in Dred Scott. I am more in-
clined toward the view of my colleagues at the Department of Jus-
tice, Charles J. Cooper and Nelson Lund, who argue that Chief
Justice Taney's constitutional interpretation was "loose, disingenu-
ous, and result-oriented."'" Justice Curtis' dissent sounded a warn-
ing over this type of judicial interpretation unattached to constitu-
tional moorings that is as compelling now as it was 125 years ago:
Political reasons have not the requisite certainty to afford rules of interpreta-
tion. They are different in different men. They are different in the same men
at different times. And when a strict interpretation of the Constitution, ac-
cording to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is aban-
doned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its
meaning, we no longer have a Constitution; we are under the government of
individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Con-
stitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to mean.
22
The judiciary's tragic failure to follow the terms of the Consti-
tution did not occur in this one instance only. Indeed, the Civil
War amendments and civil rights legislation passed in that era
were in the next several decades emptied of meaning by the Su-
preme Court in decision after decision. In Plessy v. Ferguson,23 to
cite but one example, the Court once again stepped in and, over
the lone, brilliant dissent of the elder Justice Harlan, shamefully
sacrificed the principle of "equality under law."
I daresay that had the Court fully honored its mandate under
the original Constitution in Dred Scott, or under the fourteenth
amendment in Plessy v. Ferguson, we could well have escaped
much of the racial strife and social divisiveness that Justice Mar-
shall lays at the doorstep of the Constitution itself. Indeed, the
tragic legacy of those decisions-the deadening consequences that
so regularly flow from a compromise (no matter how well intended)
of the principle of "equality under law"-provides a sobering les-
son for the present Court as it struggles with similar issues involv-
21. J. Cooper & N. Lund, Landmarks of Constitutional Interpretation, 40 POLIcy RE-
viEw, Spring 1987, at 20.
22. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 393 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
23. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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ing race and gender discrimination. These are issues that no less so
than in an earlier era leave hanging in the balance the overarching
questions of whether the liberating promise of the Constitution, as
originally understood and subsequently articulated in explicit
terms by ratification of the Civil War amendments, will or will not
be fulfilled for all Americans.
Justice Marshall, I would respectfully submit, too casually
brushes so weighty a concern to one side in contending that the
Constitution did not survive the Civil War. One would think that
this assertion would at least invite from some quarter the obvious
questions: Did separation of powers survive the Civil War? Did the
executive branch and the Congress? Did, indeed, the institution of
judicial review?
I must admit to quite a different reading of history, one that
has an abiding appreciation of the fact that our Constitution did
survive so cataclysmic an upheaval as the Civil War. In all too
many instances of internal strife among a people, one form of sub-
jugation is ultimately replaced by another. But the Civil War pro-
duced a far different (indeed unique) result: its consequence was to
secure more perfectly and extend to all Americans-through the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments-the blessings of
liberty as set forth in the Declaration of Independence, blessings of
liberty that had already been secured for other Americans in the
original Constitution and Bill of Rights. It is revisionist history of
the worst sort to suggest that the fourteenth amendment created a
blank constitutional slate on which judges could write their own
personalized definition of equality or fundamental rights. The Civil
War amendments were a logical extension of what had come
before: they represented evolutionary, not revolutionary change.
To be sure, the fourteenth amendment does offer support for
Justice Marshall's claim that the Constitution is "a living docu-
ment, ' '24 but only in the sense that the Constitution itself provides
a mechanism-namely, the amendment process-to reflect chang-
ing social realities. Indeed, this orderly process for constitutional
"evolution" is a part of the original Constitution's genius, for it
provides a mechanism to correct flaws while safeguarding the es-
sential integrity of our constitutional structure. But the existence
of this mechanism-coupled with the system of checks and bal-
ances among the three branches of the federal government and the
strong endorsement of federalism principles embodied in the tenth
24. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 1342.
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amendment-makes it abundantly clear that the Framers gave no
license to judges (members of the Branch regarded, to borrow from
Alexander Hamilton, as the "least dangerous" of the three2 5) to
construe constitutional provisions as they see fit.
There is good reason for this confluence of restraints on judi-
cial activism. The Constitution is not a mass of fungible, abstract
principles whose meaning varies with time; rather, it comprises a
broad societal consensus on certain fundamental, absolute princi-
ples necessary for the protection of individual liberty. The Framers
believed that these constitutional values should not be lightly dis-
turbed or set aside. Accordingly, the Constitution was structured
so as to require that any change reflect the broadest expression of
societal consensus.
26
This does not leave the Supreme Court or lower federal courts
unable to apply the Constitution to circumstances never contem-
plated by the Framers. But the Judges are not free to disengage
from our constitutional moorings in furtherance of their own social
agendas; they are not free to determine that the constitutional
principles themselves are unwise or obsolete.
Indeed, the very premise on which rests the notion that the
Constitution as originally framed has no relevance today is fatally
flawed. For the fact remains that the core structure upon which the
Constitution was based-a government of limited powers, federal-
ism, separation of powers, protection of fundamental individual
rights-has proven in the past two centuries far superior to any
other governmental system in protecting human freedoms. And
when proponents of change have successfully secured the broad
consensus necessary to amend the Constitution, they have ex-
panded and perfected those protections. But judicial activism as
an illegitimate substitute for the amendment process can only
jeopardize our fundamental freedoms by denigrating the structural
underpinnings vital to their survival.
Justice Marshall's contrary thesis is gerry-built on a regretta-
ble overstatement of perceived flaws in the Constitution without so
much as a passing reference to the qualities that have endured for
the past two hundred years: a governmental structure that has
withstood the test of time, weathered turbulent conflicts, and
proven itself to be the greatest engine for individual freedom in the
history of mankind. That remarkable accomplishment is certainly
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 483 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
26. See U.S. CONST. art 5.
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worth the celebration it is receiving, and much, much more.
Let us not be content with less than a complete appreciation
for this document on which our Republic stands. Let us accept
Justice Marshall's invitation to explore fully the lessons of the past
two centuries. But let us decline his invitation to break the Consti-
tution into two, and to reject the document of 1787 and accept
only that which followed the Civil War. We are under a Constitu-
tion; it is the original Constitution together with its twenty-six
amendments that we must seek to understand and uphold. Let us
never forget that the Constitution is in its entirety the Supreme
Law of the Land, and all of the branches-the executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial-are subordinate to it. We must embrace the
Constitution as a whole: not uncritically, but not unlovingly, ei-
ther. Our task, in this Bicentennial year, should be that of loving
critics. For our Constitution has provided this great nation of ours
with a charter for liberty and government that has enabled us to
move ever closer to that "more perfect Union" the Framers
envisioned.
In conclusion, it is fitting that I call on the words of former
Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Chairman of the Bicentennial
Commission. He said it best when he remarked that the Constitu-
tion "isn't perfect, but it's the best thing in the world. '2 7 Our Con-
stitution embodies the American spirit, the American Dream, and
America's doctrinal commitment to civil rights-those fundamen-
tal rights we all hold equally as American citizens. For this reason,
I respectfully part company with Justice Marshall in my view that
it is indeed our Constitution as framed two centuries ago, and
amended thereafter from time to time, that stands tall today as
"the source of all the very best that has followed."2 Let us not
hesitate to celebrate.
28. Marshall, supra note 1, at 1337.
27. Mauro, Burger on Constitution: 'It isn't Perfect,' USA Today, May 14, 1987, at
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